Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle: an Empirical Study on Developed and Developing Countries by Bogdan Bogdanov
 
 

























Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle:














































Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting and 
Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" 
Members 
Nikolay Nenovsky 
University of National and World Economy and 
Université d'Orléans 
Petar Chobanov 
Financial Supervision Commission and 
University of National and World Economy  
Georgi Ganev 
Centre for Liberal Strategies and 
Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" 
Svetoslav Maslarov 
New Bulgarian University 
Iordan Iordanov 
Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" 
Andrey Vasilev 
Bulgarian National Bank and 






All rights reserved. Users may download, display, print out and photocopy this Working Paper for personal, 
educational or other non-commercial use, without any right to resell or otherwise redistribute the material, or 
compile or create derivative material.  
Users may reproduce or translate a limited extract (not exceeding 10%) of this Working Paper in other 
publications free of charge and without written permission from the AEAF, provided the AEAF (including the 
reference www.aeaf.minfin.bg) is cited as the source and, with respect to translations, a statement is included that 
the translation is not an official AEAF translation.  
The interpretations, views and conclusions presented in this Working Paper are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting. 
 
ISBN 978-954-567-067-1 
©  Agency for Economic Analysis and Forecasting, 2010 
1000 Sofia, 31 Aksakov Str.; tel. 9859 56 01, 981 65 97; fax: 981 33 58;  
e-mail: aeaf@aeaf.minfin.bg; www.aeaf.minfin.bg 
    
Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle: 








This paper presents strong empirical evidence that automatic stabilizers and countercyclical 
fiscal policy decrease output volatility. The conducted empirical analysis proves the economic 
intuition that the automatic fiscal stance is countercyclical, regardless of the size and the 
prosperity of the economy. Connecting our empirical results to the Endogenous Growth 
Theory, we develop the idea that countercyclical fiscal policy boosts long-term economic 
growth. We conduct the study on two samples of countries – developed and developing. We 
recognize the fiscal policy pattern of the developed nations to be countercyclical, whereas 
the  one  of  the  developing  countries  to  be  acyclical.  The  derived  results  support  our 
hypothesis that countercyclical fiscal policy reduces output volatility as the volatility of per 
capita  output  of  the  developed  nations  appear  significantly  less  than  the  one  of  the 
developing countries. We identify possible determinants of fiscal policy in good and bad 
times. We empirically recognize that openness to trade, terms of trade, level of corruption 
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I.  Introduction 
This section of the paper states the purpose of our work and introduces the main concepts 
that we study. Theoretical description of fiscal policy, automatic stabilizers and discretionary 
fiscal policy is outlined. A theoretical relationship between fiscal policy, output volatility and 
economic growth is presented. Our identification strategy concerning the determinants of 
fiscal policy and its components is constructed. 
1.  Purpose of the Paper 
The main purpose of this paper is to  examine the differences between developed and 
developing countries with respect to how the behavior of their fiscal policies affects output 
volatility and economic growth over the different phases of the business cycle, as well as to 
find credible determinants of the size of the public sector. This is to be done through an 
empirical study that first establishes reliable measures of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, its 
components  –  the  automatic  stabilizers  and  the  discretionary  fiscal  policy,  and  output 
volatility. Then, we look for a relationship between fiscal stances, economic activity and 
growth in the two samples of countries we have chosen. Finally, we try to find to what 
extend fiscal policy and its components, in the two groups of economies, is determined by 
political, institutional and other macroeconomic factors. 
2.  Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal policy refers to the way a government tries to influence an economy through changes 
in taxation (government revenue collection) and spending. In practice, fiscal policy affects a 
number of macroeconomic variables  – aggregate demand, income distribution, resource 
allocation and economic activity as a whole. Governments actively use fiscal policies to 
address market failures and achieve redistributive goals. These classical functions of the role 
of a government – to correct externalities and ensure adequate provision of public goods 
and services – have a sound foundation and are conducive to higher long-run growth and 
social inclusion. In this sense, fiscal policy plays the role of the main tool a government can 
use, in order to reduce the impact of the different phases of the business cycle on the 
economy. 
3.  Automatic Stabilizers 
Conventional economic theory teaches us that automatic stabilizers are associated with the 
cyclical properties of taxes, transfer of payments and government spending during times of 
fluctuations of economic growth. In other words, the automatic change of government 
receipts and expenditures due to the current state of the economy. No action is required by 
the  government  in  order  the  automatic  stabilizers  to  work.  Moreover,  the  automatic 
stabilizers react instantly to changes of the economic environment, in much quicker and 
more timely fashion than a government would. For example, in an economy that is in   6 
recession, levels of unemployment are increasing progressively and thus, revenues from 
income and consumption taxes are decreasing. Furthermore, transfers to and services for the 
unemployed increase. Therefore, with no explicit action by the state, when an economy 
enters into recession, government revenues start decreasing and government spending start 
increasing. The opposite is true for times of economic booms. Thus, automatic stabilizers 
are often associated with countercyclical behavior, behaving in the fashion of the well known 
cyclically balanced budget – accumulated debt from the automatic stabilizers during bad 
times is offset by automatic stabilizers‟ surpluses in good times. 
4.  Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
It is often difficult for a government to rely on the automatic stabilizers solely. There are 
many countries where the effects of the business cycle over their economies cannot be 
handled  by  the  stabilizing  function  of  the  automatic  stabilizers.  In  such  cases,  those 
governments conduct discretionary fiscal policies, i.e. deliberate manipulation of taxation 
and  spending  in  order  to  promote  full  employment  and  economic  growth.  Usually, 
governments‟ fiscal policy decisions tend to be inefficient to the phases of the business cycle, 
most  of  the  times  not  matching  the  optimal  size  of  the  public  sector  needed  by the 
economic conditions in the country. Such governments engage in deep countercyclical fiscal 
policies or go the opposite direction by conducting procyclical fiscal policies (the public 
sector expands during booms and contracts during recessions). In the cases of excessive 
discretionary fiscal policy, the provisions of public goods and services may promote growth 
in the short run, but both the inefficient provision of these goods and revenue raising 
mechanisms that distort the allocation of resources may impede growth in the long run. This 
totally contradicts with one of the main goals that a fiscal policy is to achieve – to make 
smooth and fast transitions over the different stages of the business cycle. Instead, extreme 
discretionary fiscal policies prolong the phases of the business cycle and shift the economy 
in a sudden manner from a time of great economic growth to one of a severe recession. 
5.  Fiscal Policy, Output Volatility and Economic Growth 
The problem of how fiscal policy is related to economic activity and growth has been 
examined by many economists and still the question remains for most of it unanswered. It is 
hard to doubt that fiscal policy affects economic growth and output volatility in the short-
run. But does this hold true for the long-run as well? This paper will try to provide an 
answer  to  that  question.  As  suggested  from  Endogenous  Growth  Theory,  the  output 
volatility during the business cycle is related to the long-run economic growth. Then, if this 
theory holds true, it should be also true that fiscal policy is an important determinant of 
long-run economic growth via its implicit effects on output volatility. Through this complex 
relationship we try to identify whether automatic stabilizers or discretionary fiscal policy have 
any favorable effect on output volatility and economic growth.   7 
6.  Determinants of Fiscal Policy 
Knowing  that  economic  policy  may  affect  long-run  economic  growth,  it  is  of  great 
importance to understand the driving factors of fiscal policy. That is why this work also 
focuses on the finding of credible determinants of fiscal policy in both samples of countries 
–  developed  and  developing.  We  are  to  look  for  those  factors  in  a  set  of  political, 
institutional and some macroeconomic variables. The identified causes of fiscal policy will be 
of great significance to our interpretation of how economic growth could be stabilized and 
enhanced. 
II.  Literature Review 
This section of the paper presents the related literature to the problems we are to resolve in 
our work. We look at the methodologies that were previously employed to establish credible 
measures of fiscal policy, automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy. We also present 
the various approaches that were developed in previous works to determine the behavior of 
the fiscal stances over the business cycle. In addition, this part of our paper summarizes the 
results obtained by other scholars when recognizing a relationship between fiscal policy and 
economic activity and growth. Finally, we outline driving factors of fiscal policy suggested 
from chosen authors of contemporary economic literature. 
1.  Measures and Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy 
Deriving a reliable measure for the cyclicality of fiscal policy is of major importance to our 
further empirical analysis. In literature, the most frequently encountered problem was to 
identify a good public-sector variable that realistically represents the size of government.  
However, a number of approaches were developed to accurately overcome this obstacle. For 
example, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) use the growth rate of government expenditures, 
revenues and budget surpluses as fiscal variables and further, look for a relationship between 
them and respectively GDP gaps and the terms of trade. Their findings recognize that 
revenues and surpluses are insignificant public-sector variables, so their additional work is 
based on the cyclicality of government expenditures only.  Alesina and Tabellini (2005) 
differentiate the results of cyclicality of fiscal policy into two categories – fiscal policy in 
developed and developing countries. Their empirical study shows that usually countercyclical 
fiscal policy is conducted by developed countries whereas procyclical fiscal policy is engaged 
in less developed, i.e. developing countries. A similar model is developed by Badinger (2008), 
but as an explanatory variable to the cyclicality of government expenditures he uses the 
growth of real GDP, solely. His work deserves attention due to the fact that he conducts the 
study on 88 different countries for a time span of 44 years. The scale of the project limits 
him to the use of government expenditures data as a measure of the activity of fiscal policy. 
The  empirical results  of  Badinger  (2008)  confirm the  found  cyclical  pattern of  public 
spendings by Alesina and Tabellini (2005). Ilzetcki (2008) captures the behavior of fiscal   8 
policy  over  the  business  cycle  by running  GMM  regressions  of  the  detrended  log  of 
government consumption as dependent variable and the detrended log of real GDP as an 
explanatory  variable.  He  finds  evidence  that  government  consumption  and  output  are 
positively related for the cases of the developing countries, but opposite to most of the 
literature  on  the  subject,  Ilzetcki  (2008)  also  finds  that  developed  countries  exhibit 
procyclical fiscal pattern. However, his results verify that developing economies show far 
more procyclical fiscal stance. Parallel to that work is the one of Fatas and Mihov (2003), 
where the primary deficits over real GDP and the growth rate of government expenditures 
and revenues are set as dependent variables to the growth of real GDP. Their empirical study 
is focused on a sample of OECD countries and recognizes the expenditures‟ stance as the 
one that is most credible and exhibits countercyclical behavior. Although with lower levels of 
significance, Fatas and Mihov (2003) find that the primary deficit as a share of real GDP is 
countercyclical over the business cycle, whereas revenues are procyclical. 
However, a number of other scholars associate the behavior of the size of the 
government with the cyclicality of the fiscal balance only. For instance, Gavin and Perotti 
(1997) conduct an empirical study on a number of industrialized and Latin countries, where 
they use the growth rate of the fiscal surplus as dependent variable to the terms of trade and 
the growth of real GDP. Their findings suggest that in developed countries, countercyclical 
fiscal  policy is  conducted, whereas  Latin American  economies  exhibit mostly procylical 
government behavior. A similar approach to measure the size of the government is used by 
Catao and Sutton (2002) and Manasse (2006). They use the growth of fiscal surplus as share 
of GDP and regress it respectively to output gap and terms of trade, and output gap and 
public debt. As the purpose of Catao and Sutton (2002) is not to identify any particular fiscal 
patterns, that of Manasse (2006) recognizes mostly procyclical fiscal behavior when using 
OLS estimators, and acyclical in good times and procyclical in bad times when conducting 
MARS  regressions.  Aghion  and  Marinescu  (2007)  developed  an  empirical  model  that 
captures the stance of the size of the government by using the gross government debt as 
dependent variable to the GDP gap using data for the OECD countries. By means of the 
econometric AR(1) MCMC method, they derive series of cyclicality of budget policy for 
each  country.  Their  results  imply  that  budget  deficits  are  countercyclical,  having  their 
countercyclicality decreasing over time for the EMU countries and increasing for the US and 
the UK. 
A different methodology to depict the behavior of fiscal policy is presented by the 
work of Kaminski, Reinhart and Vegh (2004). By plotting real GDP and real government 
spending, their paper offers a stylized fact that fiscal policy is mainly countercyclical or 
acyclical in the OECD countries over the business cycle, and on the contrary, procyclical 
throughout a set of developing countries.   9 
2.  Measures and Cyclicality of Automatic Stabilizers 
To answer the question  “To what extend do automatic  stabilizers  smooth the business 
cycle?” we first have to identify a credible measure of this component of fiscal policy. In the 
case of the automatic stabilizers we are not that interested in the cyclical pattern of the fiscal 
stance,  because  of  the  naturally  predetermined  countercyclical  behavior  that  it  has. 
Nevertheless, we are greatly fond of finding a good proxy of the automatic fiscal stance, as it 
appears a hard task to separate the automatic from the discretionary fiscal effects.  
However, contemporary literature hasn‟t dealt extensively with this issue. There are 
very few attempts to provide theoretical analysis of automatic stabilizers in stochastic general 
equilibrium model. One such work is the one of Gali (1994) where in the context of a real 
business  cycle model with  flexible  prices  and  continuous  market  clearing,  he  identifies 
different  effects  of  government  size. These  effects  are,  however,  small in  size  and  of 
ambiguous sign. Most of the effects are related to changes in the elasticities of capital and 
labor as a result of lower values of the steady state levels of employment and the capital 
output ratio. As a whole the obtained results by Gali (1994) are ambiguous.  
A purely empirical study on the subject is the one of Fatas and Mihov (1999). There 
they use the government  size over GDP as a proxy of the measure of the automatic 
stabilizers where the government size is measured as the level of government spending. 
Further, the work of Fatas and Mihov (1999) tries to identify alternative measures of the 
automatic stabilizers by decomposing the government expenditures and revenues to their 
primary  components  –  non-wage  government  spending,  wage  government  spending, 
transfers of payments and government revenues from direct and indirect taxes, respectively. 
Their results show that only the measure of indirect taxes lacks the standard attributes of the 
automatic stabilizers. 
Fatas  and Mihov  (2003)  continue  the work  on identifying  a  good measure  of 
automatic stabilizers. Here they use several measures with the purpose to capture the effect 
of the automatic stabilizers on the economy. Initially, they use the taxes and net transfers, as 
a proxy to the measure of the automatic stabilizers. Fatas and Mihov (2003) argue that those 
variables empirically response to a very similar fashion like the more aggregate fiscal variables 
which represent the real size of the government. To further understand how automatic 
stabilizers  work,  they  look  for  a  relationship  between  the  disposable  income  and 
consumption, as the variables that predict the measure of the automatic fiscal stance, and 
output volatility. However, in their further analysis Fatas and Mihov (2003) try to avoid 
capturing any discretional fiscal policy as bias to their results that is why they use the 
marginal tax rate on labor as direct measure of automatic stabilizers. Further, they take a 
broader view on the automatic component of fiscal policy and construct a measure that 
captures the responsiveness of fiscal policy to cyclical conditions and try to identify whether 
this measure is responsible for the correlation between the size of the government and the 
output volatility. Fatas and Mihov (2003) measure the responsiveness of fiscal policy as the   10 
elasticity of fiscal variables to GDP changes. Using the primary deficit as fiscal variable, they 
run the specified regression for each country, extracting the coefficients and thus building 
the desired measure. 
3.  Measures and Cyclicality of Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
The second component of fiscal policy is the deliberate intervention of the government via 
taxation and spending in the economy. Again, a major issue to be resolved in an empirical 
study of fiscal policy is what indicator to use as a credible measure of the discretionary fiscal 
policy. Similarly to the automatic stabilizers, we are not that interested in the cyclical pattern 
of the discretionary fiscal policy, but in a methodology to develop a trustworthy measure of 
the unanticipated fiscal behaviour. Fatas and Mihov (2003) use vector autoregressions (VAR) 
to extract the indicator of fiscal policy stance. Their baseline VAR contains logarithm of 
private output, logarithm of the implicit GDP deflator, ratio of primary deficit to output and 
T-bill rate. They regard this  vector of variables  as the minimal  set of macroeconomic 
variables necessary for the construction of an indicator of fiscal policy. After estimating the 
reduced  form  of  their  regression  equations,  Fatas  and  Mihov  (2003)  orthogonize  the 
residuals from the fiscal policy equation to contemporaneous movements in output and 
prices. This orthogonalized residual is their measure of unanticipated fiscal policy shifts. 
The extracted indicator of fiscal policy by Fatas and Mihov (2003) turns out to be 
very highly correlated with the measure they construct on Blanchard‟s (1993) suggestions. In 
his work, Blanchard (1993) argues that an indicator of discretionary fiscal policy must be 
relative in nature. The procedure outlined in his paper requires selecting a pre-specified 
benchmark  and  estimating  elasticities  of  the  different  components  of  the  budget with 
respect to a representative set of macroeconomic variables. The response of the budget 
deficit to current economic conditions is then constructed by using the estimated elasticities. 
The difference between this value and the actual budget deficit is a measure of discretionary 
fiscal policy. Blanchard (1993) original recommendation is to use unemployment, inflation, 
and interest rates in the construction of the induced changes in the budget balance. The 
presented equation for calculating the index of discretionary change looks like: 
  
Alesina and Perotti (1996) propose a slightly modified version of the above equation. In their 
work, instead of dividing on gross national product from the current and the previous 
period, they divide on gross domestic product. Alesina and Perotti (1996) derive series of 
fiscal impulses for each country in their sample. Their findings suggest that episodes of 
strong adjustments of fiscal policy result to a bigger extend from expenditure cut fiscal 
policies rather than tax revenue increases.   11 
An  alternative  methodology  to  calculate  the  fiscal  impulse  is  proposed  by 
Chouraqui,  Hagemann  and  Sartor  (1990).  Their  measure  also  known  as  the  “Dutch 
measure”, defines the fiscal impulse as the difference between the current primary deficit and 
the primary deficit that would have prevailed if expenditure in the previous year had grown 
with potential GDP, and revenues had grown with actual GDP. Like the Blanchard (1993) 
measure, this measure takes the previous year as the benchmark year. However, here the 
cyclically neutral expenditure is assumed to be proportional to potential output, while the 
cyclically neutral taxation is assumed to be proportional to actual output. The Chouraqui, 
Hagemann and Sartor (1990) approach to define discretionary fiscal policy is frequently used 
in the estimation of the OECD organization. 
A different approach to the problem of finding a measure of the discretionary 
component of fiscal policy is presented in the work of Badinger (2008). There he follows 
the standard approach and estimates cyclicality of the fiscal parameters by regressing growth 
of real government consumption on the growth of real GDP and correcting for serial 
correlation in the  error term. The  estimate  of the  structural residual  of the  proposed 
regression equation is interpreted as series of discretionary fiscal shocks. He estimates this by 
use of ordinary least squares and as a result he obtains a decomposition of the growth of 
government consumption into a cyclical and discretionary component. 
4.  Effects of Fiscal Policy on Growth and Output Volatility 
The core of this paper is concentrated on the effects of fiscal policy and its components – 
the automatic stabilizers and the discretionary fiscal policy, on economic growth and output 
volatility. Contemporary literature has examined this issue with the great number of various 
fiscal measures presented in the previous sections of the paper. In the work of Aghion and 
Marinescu (2007) the authors analyze the dynamics of the cyclicality of budgetary policy, 
which they identify as  a reliable  proxy  for the  policy behavior, on  a  panel  of OECD 
countries in the time span 1960-2006. Their findings suggest that countercyclical fiscal policy 
is  positively  associated  with  economic  growth,  especially  if  the  country‟s  financial 
development is lower. 
Despite the ambiguity of the theoretical model in Gali (1994), his empirical analysis 
suggests that there is a strong negative relationship between the identified measures of 
automatic  stabilizers  and  output  volatility,  not  considering  the  cyclical  behavior  of  the 
studied fiscal variable. Gali‟s (1994) results are verified in the work of Fatas and Mihov 
(1999).  When  examining  the  role  of  the  automatic  stabilizers  on  a  panel  of  OECD 
economies in the period 1960-1997, they reach the conclusion that their proxy measures of 
the automatic fiscal stance is strongly negatively correlated with the volatility of the business 
cycles.  They  prove  that  by  using  not  only  government  fiscal  variables  but  also 
macroeconomic variables from the private sector. Fatas and Mihov (1999) even go further 
and check for reverse causality that originates in the possibility that more volatile economies 
have larger governments in order to insure them against additional international risk. When   12 
accounting for the possible endogeneity of the public sector, they find that the stabilizing 
effect of the government size becomes even stronger and larger in absolute values. 
In the continued work of Fatas and Mihov (2003) they verify the results obtained in 
their paper from 1999 and further look for the impact of the found discretionary fiscal 
stance  on  economic  activity.  Their  results  suggest  that  there  is  a  strong,  positive  and 
persistent effect of discretionary fiscal expansions on output volatility, regardless of the 
cyclical behavior of the government policy. Badinger (2008) is building on the research of 
Fatas and Mihov (2003) by conducting an empirical study on 88 countries from different 
regions of the world in the time span 1960-2004. He provides comprehensive empirical 
evidence that discretionary fiscal policy, defined as policy unrelated to the business cycle, and 
cyclical  fiscal  policy  lower  output  growth  by  increasing  output  volatility.  The  found 
destabilizing effects do not depend on whether the discretionary fiscal policy is pro- or 
countercyclical.  
5.  Determinants of Fiscal Policy 
A  great  amount  of  high-quality  literature  deals  with  the  problem  of  identifying  the 
determinants of fiscal policy. Such work is the one of Aghion and Marinescu (2007) where 
they find that lower level of financial development, higher degree of openness to trade and 
absence of inflation targeting result in lower degree of countercyclicality of fiscal policy, 
budget deficits in particular. 
Rodrik (1998) presents another comprehensive empirical evidence that openness to 
trade has a significant positive association with most of the fiscal variables comprising the 
government expenditures. An explanation offered to this phenomenon is that there exists 
social insurance against external risk, i.e. governments consume larger share of aggregate 
output in economies subject to greater amount of external risk. Once Rodrik (1998) controls 
for  external  risk,  openness  to  trade  doesn‟t  seem  to  exert  an  independent  effect  on 
government consumption. His conclusive empirical results indicate that spending on social 
security and welfare is significantly more sensitive to exposure to external risk than is the 
total government consumption. 
The work of Gavin and Perroti (1997) explains the found in their paper procyclical 
fiscal behavior in Latin America in the period 1968-1995 with loss of market access during 
macroeconomic  bad  times.  Their  findings  are  consistent  with  the  fact  that  access  to 
emergency credit is higher during bad times when countercyclical fiscal stance is observed, 
thus credit constraints in Latin America are found as major reason for the procyclicality of 
fiscal policy in the region. Gavin and Perroti (1997) also offer another explanation to the 
South  American  fiscal  phenomenon  –  the  voracity  effects  associated  with  political 
distortions.  
Manasse (2006) finds that policy reaction is different depending on the state of the 
economy – acyclical in bad times and largely procyclical in during good times. He tries to 
explain this policy behavior with the presence of fiscal rules, such as limits on deficits,   13 
borrowing or spending. Manasse (2006) finds evidence that these fiscal constraints may 
reduce the deficits on average and furthermore, enhance rather than weaken countercyclical 
fiscal policy. His work also recognizes that strong institutions reduce the deficit bias on 
average. Better institutions are associated with lower procyclicality in good times and higher 
prociclicality in bad times.  
An interesting approach to the problem was the one of Alesina and Tabellini (2005). 
Their  empirical  study  shows  that  usually  countercyclical  fiscal  policy  is  conducted  by 
developed  countries  whereas  procyclical  fiscal  policy  is  engaged  in  less  developed,  i.e. 
developing countries. The reason they offer to this phenomenon is political – people don‟t 
trust corrupt government. Their empirical study tries to identify a relationship between the 
level of control of corruption and cyclicality of fiscal policy. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) use 
data for the OECD countries as well as countries from the Sub-Saharan and Latin American 
region.  They  find  that  countercyclical  fiscal  policy  is  conducted  through  most  of  the 
developed countries in OECD and on the contrary, strict procyclical fiscal policy is engaged 
in the developing countries from South America and Central Africa. Furthermore, they 
identify strong, positive and persistent relationship between the control of corruption and 
the cyclicality of fiscal policy. Their empirical results verify the initial assumption that people 
from developing  countries may not  trust their  governments. Their  explanation for this 
phenomenon is that voters demand tax cuts as well as increase in productive government 
spending when positive shocks hit the economy. According to Alesina and Tabellini (2005), 
for the same reason voters don‟t allow governments to build-up reserves and assets but 
rather demand government debt for which the government will have to allocate resources to 
pay the interest and respectively, spend everything that could be stolen. They disregard all 
credit constraint issues that a developing country may encounter during an economic shock, 
as the results that their empirical study show identify this reason for procyclicality of fiscal 
policy as a highly insignificant. 
III. Specification of the Empirical Models 
This section justifies our choice of fiscal, economic, institutional and political variables, and 
reveals our intuition and methodology in constructing the implemented empirical models. 
Initially, we motivate the  employed  “per  capita”  approach in  our analysis  and then we 
assemble reliable measures of fiscal policy, automatic stabilizers and discretionary policy. We 
present reasonable  explanation  for the  composed regression  equations  that  capture the 
cyclical behavior of the fiscal stances. Further, we outline the approach we use to estimate 
the potential output and the output gap, and we develop the procedure through which we 
capture the influence of fiscal policy on output volatility. Finally, we propose a regression 
equation that suggests a number of possible determinants of all fiscal variables that we have 
constructed.   14 
1.  The “per capita” Approach 
In our work, we calculate all measures of the economy and the public sector in “per capita” 
terms. This approach is innovative and it hasn‟t been used in the analyzed related literature. 
Our motivation behind this choice can be explained by a number of arguments: 
First, the problem of identifying a good measure of the size of the government is 
partially overcome by the use of “per capita” fiscal variables. In the previous section, we 
have seen that one of the most problematic issues related to the empirical studies of fiscal 
policy, is how to measure correctly the size of the government. By using the „per capita” 
standard, we capture the portion of government dedicated to each citizen, i.e. the role of the 
state  in individual  terms.  This  further  gives  us  an  actual  and reasonable  view of  how 
government influence behaves over time. 
Second, as we are not interested in the real sizes of the examined economies, by 
using GDP per capita we successfully obtain a measure that is also a good proxy of the 
standards of living in the examined sets of countries. The aggregate value of gross domestic 
product might be misleading to our interpretation of what is a developed or developing 
country. Thus, by calculating in “per capita” terms, not only we preserve all properties of the 
actual total output, but we are also able to clearly classify the chosen economies to developed 
and developing ones. 
And third, we correct for demographic shocks. In our study, the population levels 
and growth are of great importance to the correctness of our estimations. The long time 
span of our empirical analysis may suffer from the endogenous nature of the population 
size, which in terms may result as bias in all aggregate variables simultaneously. By using “per 
capita” measures in our models, we actually divide everything by the size of the population 
for the given period and therefore, we correct for possible heteroskedasticity that might exist 
in our data sample. 
To  summarize,  the  “per  capita”  approach  gives  us  a  more  realistic  and 
comprehensive picture of the government‟s role on the economy. The use of variables 
measured in “per capita” terms sustains the simplicity of our work, fixes for the endogenous 
effects of the demographic shocks, gives us a realistic proxy for the actual size of the 
government, and well differentiates the two samples of economies by the resulted gap in 
standards of living. 
2.  Measures and Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy 
2.1.  Measures of Fiscal Policy 
In our work, we follow the standard methodology in the related literature and we use the 
growth rates of government revenues and expenditures as well as the fiscal deficits as share 
of total output as measures of fiscal policy. These fiscal measures are the most general ones 
and have been proved to serve as good proxies of the fiscal policy behavior by the works of   15 
Fatas and Mihov (1999), Fatas and MIhov (2003), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Badinger 
(2008), Gavin and Perotti (1997), Manasse (2006) and Kaminski, Reinhart and Vegh (2004). 
2.2.  Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy 
As there could not be developed any mathematical proof or clear economic theory about the 
problem wether  fiscal  policy has  an  impact  on  economic  growth  or  economic  growth 
influences fiscal policy, or both affect each other simultaneously, we follow the approach 
designed  in  most  of  the  literature  concerned  with  cyclicality  of  fiscal  policy  and  its 
components. Hence, the causality pattern of all empirical models that are to be used in our 
work assumes that cyclicality of fiscal policy is dependent on economic growth. In that 
sense, we construct three regression equations that are intended to give us a reasonable view 
of the fiscal stances over the business cycle: 
   
   
 
where    stands  for  real  government  revenues  per  capita,    for  real  government 
expenditures per capita,  for real gross domestic product per capita,   for real total 
government expenditures,   for real total government revenues,  for real gross domestic 
product,  i  is  a  subscript  for the  country  ID  and  t  for the time.  In  equation (2c)  our 
dependent  variable  is  not  calculated  in  per  capita  terms  because  by  dividing  both  the 
nominator and the denominator by the population level, the population level eliminates itself. 
The   coefficients in equations (2a), (2b) and (2c) are measures of the cyclical 
behavior of our chosen dependent variables over the business cycle. However, there exists a 
disagreement  how  to  interpret  those  coefficients.  That  is  why,  by  following  the  most 
common  approach  in  the  contemporary  economic  literature,  here  we  define  what  is 
countercyclical, procyclical and acyclical fiscal policy: 
Table 1. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy 
 coefficient  Countercyclical  Procyclical 
Eq. (2a)  +  - 
Eq. (2b)  -  + 
Eq. (2c)  -  + 
Thus, we define countercyclical fiscal policy when the growth rate of   is 
positively associated to the growth rate of   and at the same time negatively related to the 
growth rate of   and the fiscal deficits. We recognize a fiscal policy to be procyclical when 
the estimated   coefficients exhibit the opposite to the described above relationships with   16 
the  growth  rate  of  .  Finally,  we  define  acyclical  fiscal  policy  when  all  other 
combinations of signs are observed or in the event when more than two of the estimated 
coefficients are insignificant. We do not set any expected signs for the   coefficients of the 
constructed regression equations. However, the broad literature on the subject suggests that 
developed nations  follow countercyclical fiscal policy, whereas in most cases developing 
economies are found to exhibit pro- or acyclical fiscal behavior. 
Similar causality intuition and methodology are used in the works of Fatas and 
MIhov (2003), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Badinger (2008), Gavin and Perotti (1997) and 
Manasse (2006). 
3.  Measures and Cyclicality of Automatic Stabilizers 
3.1.  Measures of Automatic Stabilizers 
It is very questionable which fiscal variable correctly mirrors the behavior of the automatic 
stabilizers. Although the literature on the subject is very limited, the works of Fatas and 
Mihov (1999) and Fatas and Mihov (2003) suggest that all components of the government 
tax revenue, except the indirect taxes, as well as the ratio of government expenditures to 
output, exhibit the fundamental properties of the automatic fiscal stance. In our paper, we 
consider two variables that could serve the role of an automatic stabilizer in our further 
analysis. We choose the government tax on income, profits and capital gains as well as the 
suggested from Fatas and Mihov (1999) and Fatas and Mihov (2003) ratio of government 
expenditures  to  output.  We  consider  those  two  fiscal  measures  a  good  proxy  of  the 
automatic stabilizers and moreover, we would eventually choose one of them, depending on 
their cyclical correctness and significant relationship with the growth of gross domestic 
product, to continue our further empirical analysis on output volatility. 
3.2.  Cyclicality of Automatic Stabilizers 
Similarly to Section 2.2 of our paper, we use the same intuitive causality and methodology to 
construct the regression equations that show us the cyclical pattern of the chosen measures 
of automatic stabilizers: 
 
 
where  stands for governemnt real tax on income, profits and capital gains per 
capita. 
The estimated   coefficients from equations (3a) and (3b) show us the behavior of 
the chosen proxies of automatic stabilizers over the business cycle. For our further empirical 
analysis, we choose the variable that performs better in the specified regression equations. In 
particular, we  are  looking  for  a  significant  and  procyclical  behavior  of  the  per  capita   17 
government tax on income, profits and capital gains and a significant and countercyclical 
behavior of the ratio of real total government expenditures to real output. We define the 
cyclicalities of the selected variables trough the following table: 
Table 2. Cyclicality of Automatic Stabilizers 
 coefficient  Countercyclical  Procyclical 
Eq. (3a)  -  + 
Eq. (3b)  +  - 
In the event when the estimated coefficients are insignificant, we define the variables 
as acyclical. For the purposes of simplicity in our additional work in this section, the chosen 
variable that would represent the measure and the cyclical stance of the automatic stabilizers 
will be referred to as AUTO. 
4.  Measures and Cyclicality of Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
4.1.  Measures of Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
Current economic literature hasn‟t found a good proxy of the discretionary fiscal policy 
among  the  statistical  data  samples  presently  available.  Thus,  in  order  to  estimate  the 
discretionary impulse of fiscal policy, we employ the two most popular indexes developed to 
capture the discretionary fiscal behaviour. 
Most works on the subject take the methodology proposed by Blanchard (1993) to 
calculate  the  discretionary  fiscal  impulse.  However,  due  to  our  limited  dataset  of 
unemployment  rate,  we  have  decided  to  also  adopt  the  function  for  calculating  the 
discretionary fiscal stance developed by Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor (1990) and widely 
used by the OECD: 
 
where  stands  for  the  derived  discretionary  fiscal  impulse  and    for 
potential real gross domestic product per capita. In this equation, we take all variables in per 
capita terms, because we divide the nominator and the denominator on the population level 
from different  periods, thus  they don‟t  eliminate  each  other. The interpretation  of the 
derived discretionary impulse is described in the following table:   18 
Table 3. Interpretation of   index 
       
Interpretation  Discretionary Fiscal 
Contraction  No Discretionary Action  Discretionary Fiscal 
Expansion 
Despite the fact that the Blanchard (1993) measure would generate a limited dataset 
of the discretionary fiscal impulse, we employ it. However, we use the modified by Alesina 
and Perotti (1996) methodology: 
 
where  stands for the derived discretionary fiscal impulse and  for the 
unemployment rate. The interpretation of the derived discretionary impulse is described in 
the following table: 
Table 4. Interpretation of   index 
       
Interpretation  Discretionary Fiscal 
Contraction  No Discretionary Action  Discretionary Fiscal 
Expansion 
Throughout the rest of our work we use both measures of discretionary fiscal 
impulse. We compare and contrast the behavior and the effects the two measures exhibit in 
our further empirical analysis. 
4.2.  Cyclicality of Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
Similarly to  Section 2.2  and  3.2 of  our paper, we use the  same intuitive  causality and 
methodology to construct the regression equations that will show us the cyclical pattern of 
the derived measures of discretionary fiscal policy. However, throughout all our estimations 
we consider the discretionary impulse from the previous period. Economic theory suggests 
that discretionary fiscal policy affects an economy slowler than automatic stabilizers do. We 
assume that the economic environment needs one year to fully assimilate the new conditions 
set up by the discretionary fiscal policy decision of the government: 
 
 
The estimated   coefficients from equations (5a) and (5b) show us the behavior of our 
proxies of discretionary fiscal impulse over the business cycle. We do not set any expected 
signs  for  the    coefficients  of  the  constructed  regression  equations.  We  define  the 
cyclicalities of the derived fiscal variables in the following table:   19 
Table 5. Cyclicality of Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
 coefficient  Countercyclical  Procyclical 
Eq. (5a)  +  - 
Eq. (5b)  +  - 
In  case  the  estimated  coefficients  are  insignificant,  we  define  the  variables  as 
acyclical. 
5.  Effects of Fiscal Policy on Growth and Output Volatility 
5.1.  Potential Output and Output Gap 
In order to continue our empirical analysis, we have to construct a credible measure of 
output volatility. An instant candidate for this variable is the standard deviation of GDP. 
However, this procedure would return a single value per country for the selected time span, 
whereas we need series of output volatility values. That is the reason we decided to use the 
output gap as a proxy for output volatility. The output gap is the percentage difference 
between potential and actual output per capita. Potential output is defined as the level of real 
GDP that the economy can produce, by fully employing all the factors of production, given 
the actual level of technology and without causing acceleration in inflation. 
Our choice is well justified from a theoretical point of view as well. As one of the 
primary purposes of fiscal policy is to foster full employment through the provision of 
public goods and services, it is potential output that is the target to be achieved by the 
government. In the sense of the theory we are building, the deviation of the actual output 
from  the  potential  one  appears  to  be  the  gap  that  is  to  be  eliminated  through  the 
mechanisms of fiscal policy. 
However, another issue arises once we have decided to use potential output in our 
estimations, and it is how exactly we should calculate the potential gross domestic product. A 
great amount of economic literature deals with this problem. For example, Ganev (2004) 
summarizes that there generally exist two types of solutions to the problem – estimations of 
potential output via production functions and via filters. Nonetheless, as Ganev (2004) states 
it, there don‟t exist accurate labor, capital and technology measures and thus, calculating 
potential gross domestic product with production functions is cumbersome. On the other 
hand, a number of filters have been developed through the recent years, and as the empirical 
results  of  Ganev  (2004)  suggest,  they  may  generate  quite  reasonable  results  for  data 
observations  of long time  span. That‟s the reason we  focus  on the  filter proposed by 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) – the one that is most widely used in the related literature to our 
subject. We further refer to that filter as the HP filter. 
In  the  work  of  Hodrick  and  Prescott  (1997),  they  assume  that  the  growth 
component of a time series variable have a smooth variation over time. They decompose the 
variable in mind to a cyclical component -  , and a growth trend component -  . They also   20 
assume that in the long run the generated deviations offset each other and average to a zero. 
In our case, the HP filter decomposition looks like: 
 
The growth component is derived by solving the minimization problem: 
 
where   is a smoothing parameter. The larger the value of this parameter, the smoother the 
obtained trend. For annual data, as recommended from Ravn and Uhlig (2002), the value of 
6.25  is  preferred.  In  the  above  equation,  the  first  term  is  the  square  of  the  cyclical 
component and the second one is the square of the change of the growth trend component. 
As a result, the HP filter returns a smooth trend – the potential real GDP per capita, as well 
as the difference between the observed and the filtered values – in our case the real GDP 
gap per capita. 
5.2.  Output Volatility and Fiscal Policy 
Throughout this  subsection we  build  the regression  equations  that  look  for  a  credible 
relationship between output volatility and fiscal policy – the most intriguing part and ultimate 
goal of our work. In our great interest here are the measures of automatic stabilizers and 
discretionary fiscal policy that we have previously identified as well as the generated via the 
HP filter – potential real output per capita. For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we 
transform the extracted real GDP per capita gap variable in absolute values. We do that 
because we are not interested whether the derived deviation is positive or negative. We don‟t 
differentiate between overheating and unutilized economy. We look for the stabilizing effects 
of the fiscal policy toward the optimal potential real GDP generated by the HP filter. We 
further divide the real output gap per capita on the real aggregate potential output. We do 
that in order to obtain the percentage deviation of the actual real GDP per capita from the 
potential real GDP per capita. 
We attempt to explain the behavior of the deviation from the potential real output 
per capita by regressing it against the stance of the two components of fiscal policy – the 
automatic stabilizers and the discretionary fiscal impulse of the previous period:  
 
 
where   is the absolute percentage deviation of the actual real GDP per 
capita  from the  potential real  GDP  per  capita. The    coefficients  from the  estimated   21 
regression equations are of great interest to our interpretation of the role of fiscal policy 
over  the  business  cycle.  We  do  not  expect  any  particular  results  from  the  estimated 
regression equations. The obtained results are to be deeply analyzed and conclusions are 
about to be drawn about the effects of the automatic stabilizers and the discretionary fiscal 
policy on output volatility in both developed and developing nations. 
6.  Determinants of Fiscal Policy 
As the final step of our work, we try to recognize the driving forces behind all the fiscal 
variables we have identified up to now. Throughout the literature review section of this 
paper, we observe that not only macroeconomic indicators are held responsible for the 
behavior of the fiscal stances, but also a few institutional and political variables are found to 
influence  the  governments‟  fiscal  decisions.  Therefore,  we  have  picked  four  potential 
variables that to some extend can provide a credible explanation for the behavior of the 
fiscal stances. 
As suggested from the broad literature on the subject, we employ the openness to 
trade and the terms of trade macroeconomic variables. We define openness to trade as the 
ratio of the sum of imports and exports to output, and terms of trade as the ratio of 
exports to imports. Moreover, as advocated by Aghion and Marinescu (2007), we include to 
our set the macroeconomic variables financial development, which represents the ratio of 
private credit to gross domestic product. In addition, we also take into account the findings 
of Alesina and Tabellini (2005) that the index of control of corruption is highly correlated 
with fiscal policy and thus, we incorporate this variable into our estimations. Furthermore, to 
catch a reasonable effect of those explanatory variables, we build the notions of good and 
bad times. As a benchmark, to differentiate between good and bad times, we take the 
arithmetic mean of   for both sets of countries. The observations that refer 
to the years where   is less than its arithmetic mean, we consider as the good 
times  of  smooth  economic  growth.  On  the  other  hand,  the  observations  where 
 is equal or greater than its arithmetic mean, we consider as the bad times of 
economic extremes  and  shocks. Our motivation behind the use  of    as 
benchmark for good and bad times lies in the fact that the ultimate purpose of our work is 
to find the factors, which help for decreasing the output volatility through the means of 
fiscal  policy. At last, we  attempt to identify the  determinants  of  fiscal  policy with the 
following regression equations: 
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where eq. (8a) takes into account the observations of the good times and eq. (8b) of the bad 
times,  Z  stands  for  the  six  stances  of  fiscal  policy  we  have  recognized:  , 
,  ,  ,  ,  ,   for openness to trade,  
 for terms of trade,   for the control of corruption index and   for the 
financial development. 
The estimated  coefficients are of great interest to our understandings for the 
driving forces of fiscal policy. We do not set any expected signs for the   coefficients of the 
constructed regression equations. The derived results are to be thoroughly analyzed for both 
samples  of  countries.  Empirical  evidence  about  how  institutional,  political  and 
macroeconomic factors influence fiscal policy making, is about to be found. 
IV. Empirical Results 
This chapter of the paper presents our empirical results and the interpretations we attach to 
them.  First, we  describe  our  data,  country-selection  and  time  span.  Then, we  build  a 
procedure, with which we test the statistical significance of our variables and regression 
equations. Furthermore, we interpret the valid estimations of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, 
automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy, as well as the effects of fiscal policy on 
output volatility. At last, we scrutinize at the results that define the determinants of fiscal 
policy and its components. Nevertheless, the obtained results should be interpreted with 
caution as we claim to have identified only empirical relationships among the studied fiscal, 
macroeconomic and institutional variables. 
1.  Data 
Our work is focused on an empirical analysis based on key macroeconomic, fiscal and 
institutional variables of seven developed and twenty three developing countries listed in 
Table 6 (Appendix A). Our data is annual with time span from 1972 to 2001. It is essential to 
point  out  that  the  nations we  have  picked  preserve  the  properties  of  a  developed  or 
developing country for the whole time span of the empirical analysis. Through our selection 
of economies, we included countries that during the time span of our empirical analysis had 
little or no presence of communist, socialist or totalitarian government. 
In Section 3 of this paper, we presented our methodology for deriving the needed 
dependent  and  explanatory  variables  for  our  regression  equations.  The  sources  of  the 
required base variables, through which we develop our dependent and explanatory variables, 
are listed in Table 7 (Appendix A). 
We construct two panels of time series cross sectional data – one for the developed 
and another for the developing nations. The procedures ran on both panels are identical as a 
decisive goal of our work is to compare and contrast the obtained results for both sets of 
economies.   23 
2.  Panel Data Analysis 
Before proceeding to the interpretations of our empirical results, we are about to build the 
procedure with which we test the statistical significance of our results. In basic terms, we 
check  whether  the  dependent  variables  are  stationary,  the  regression  variables  are 
cointegrated, residuals are homoskedastic, and there doesn‟t exists serial correlation. The 
estimation method of fixed or random effects is preferred. Here, it is important to note that 
due to the theoretically supported design of our variables and regression equations, we do 
not change the dimensions and the structure of those that do not pass the testing procedure 
described below, because doing so will distort our interpretations and thus, result in illusory 
and incorrect analysis. Instead, we ignore the results obtained with the statistically invalid 
variables and regression equations. 
First, we perform a test for unit roots on all dependent variables in our regression 
equations. We use Fisher‟s test, a panel data based test developed by Maddala and Wu (1999) 
that combines the p-values from N independent unit root tests. Based on the p-values of 
individual unit root tests, Fisher's test assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null 
hypothesis against the alternative that at least one series in the panel is stationary. If a 
dependent  variable  doesn‟t  pass  the  described  stationary test, we ignore  the  regression 
equation in which it is part of. 
Using the Fisher‟s test, we also check whether cointegration exists on all of the 
remaining regression  equations. We perform the test  on the  predicted residuals  of the 
regressions, where the null hypothesis assumes that there is no cointegration between the 
regressed variables and vice versa for the alternative hypothesis. If a regression equation 
doesn‟t pass the test for cointegration, we ignore it as cointegration is assumed to be present 
in the further fixed and random effects estimations. 
Further,  we  perform  a  test  for  serial  correlation  on  the  remaining  regression 
equations using the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data. The tested null 
hypothesis here is that there is no serial correlation in the given specification. In the cases 
when we reject the null hypothesis, we don‟t ignore the given regression equations as we can 
fix for the experienced serial correlation with both fixed and random effects methodologies. 
Moreover, we test the regression equations for heteroskedasticity. As there doesn‟t 
exist such test procedure for panel data in the available software (STATA 9.1), we employ an 
approach  that  consists  of  a  number  of  steps.  First,  knowing  that  GLS  regression 
methodology  with  only  heteroskedasticity  produces  maximum-likelihood  parameter 
estimates, we run a GLS regression to fit the given regression equation with panel-level 
heteroskedasticity and then save the likelihood. After that we run the same GLS regression 
without  heteroskedasticity  and  store  the  resulted  model  as  well.  Then  we  employ  the 
likelihood-ratio test, running it with nested models (the two we have stored). In the described 
procedure the null hypothesis assumes homoskedasticity. In the cases when we reject the null   24 
hypothesis,  we  don‟t  ignore  the  given  regression  equations  as  we  can  fix  for  the 
heteroskedasticity with both fixed and random effects methodologies. 
In  an  empirical work with  panel  data,  the  choice  between  the  two  alternative 
regressions – fixed or random effects  – is fundamental. The generally accepted way of 
choosing between fixed and random effects is running a Hausman test. The Hausman test 
checks a more efficient model against a less efficient, but consistent model, to make sure that 
the more efficient model also gives consistent results. In our case of panel data, the more 
efficient model is the random effects one. Thus, we assume the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects estimator are the same as the ones 
estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. In the cases when we reject the null 
hypothesis, it is better for us to use fixed effects estimations, where if serial correlation or 
heteroskedasticity exists, we fix with the “robust” STATA command. In the cases when we 
don‟t  reject  the  null  hypothesis,  it  is  more  efficient  for  us  to  use  the  random  effects 
estimation, which  on  panel  data regressions  automatically  fix  for  serial  correlation  and 
heteroskedasticity, if any. 
Based on the described validation procedure above, we have excluded 24 out of the 
planned  48  regression  equations.  We  do  that  in  order  to  avoid  conducting  misleading 
estimations and spurious regressions. For the panel of the developed nations we ignore 
regression  equations  (2c),  (3b),  (5a),  (8a)  where  dependent  variable  is  –  , 
,  ,  and  (8b)  where  dependent  variable  is  - 
,  ,  ,  . For the panel of the 
developing nations we exclude regression equations (3b), (8a) where dependent variable is –  
 and  , and (8b) with all dependent variables. The technical results 
from all regression equations that satisfy our validation procedure are listed in Appendix B. 
3.  Interpretation of the Empirical Results 
3.1.  Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy 
The first stage of our empirical analysis is to find what behavior do the fiscal policies of 
both developed and developing countries exhibit. We run regression equations (2a) and (2b) 
for the panel of the developed nations. In Table 8 we outline the obtained results: 













Adj R2  0.20  0.02   25 
Estimation Method  Random Effects  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
The estimated coefficients and significance were expected by the results stated in the 
broad literature on the subject. The behavior of the government revenues per capita is 
strongly procyclical as 1% increase of per capita output results in 0.90% in per capita tax 
revenue. Furthermore, government expenditures per capita exhibit countercyclical pattern as 
1 % increase of GDP per capita is mirrored by 0.27% decrease of government spending per 
capita.  Although  we  cannot  take  into  account  Eq.  (2c)  in  order  to  fully  verify  our 
interpretations based on the definition of countercyclical fiscal policy in Chapter III, we can 
conclude that indeed, fiscal policy in developed countries exhibits countercyclical stance. 
We  continue  by  regressing  equations  (2a),  (2b)  and  (2c)  on  the  panel  of  the 
developing countries. In Table 9 we outline the obtained results: 


















Adj R2  0.25  0.09  0.02 
Estimation Method  Random Effects  Random Effects  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
Based on the definition of our interpretation of the results in Chapter III, the 
estimated  results  cannot  lead  us  to  any  specific  conclusions.  We  see  that  government 
revenues per capita are strongly procyclical as 1% increase GDP per capita results in 1.03% 
increase  in  per  capita  government revenues. Moreover, it  is  clear  that the  government 
expenditures per capita are also procyclical as 1% increase in output per capita results in 
0.74% increase of government spendings per capita. However, the fiscal deficits exhibit 
countercyclical fiscal stance as the estimations show that 1% increase in GDP per capita 
results in -0.09% less debt. Thus, according to our definition of acyclical fiscal policy in 
Chapter III, we identify the fiscal policy pattern of the developing countries as such. 
However,  the  estimated  regression  equations  (2b)  for  the  panel  data  of  the 
developed countries and (2c) for the panel data of the developing countries result with Adj 
R2 of very small value. The small Adj R2 could be addressed to the fact that the chosen fiscal   26 
variables cannot fully explain the variability of the growth rate of  . Moreover, ss we 
are not looking for a set of explanatory variables of output growth, but instead, we only 
attempt to identify a the cyclical stance of the tested fiscal variables, the small values of the 
Adj R2 for both panels of data are tolerable for the correctness of the interpretations of the 
obtained results. 
So, the first major discrepancy between the two sets of economies we have chosen is 
that they differ in their fiscal policies behavior over the business cycle. The estimations based 
on the panel of the developed countries suggest countercyclical fiscal policy, whereas those 
conducted on the data of the developing economies imply acyclical fiscal policy pattern. 
3.2.  Cyclicality of Automatic Stabilizers 
This section of our empirical analysis deals with the validation of our choice of a proxy for 
the automatic stabilizers. As we ignore Eq. (3b) for both sets of countries, we are left only 
with the fiscal variable – taxes on income, profits and capital gains per capita, to serve the 
role of a proxy for the automatic fiscal stance. First, we perform Eq. (3a) on the panel data 
of the developed countries. In Table 10 we outline the obtained results: 








Adj R2  0.14 
Estimation Method  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
The estimated results confirm our intuition that the taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains per capita could be a good proxy for the automatic stabilizers. With 1% increase 
of GDP per capita, our proxy of the automatic fiscal stance increases with 1.43%. As the 
chosen variable is tax-based, it is natural for it to be procyclical with the per capita output. 
This  procyclical  behavior  of  the  examined  variable  actually  implies  the  countercyclical 
pattern of the automatic stabilizers. 
Next, we perform the same regression equation on the panel of the developing 
countries. In Table 11 we outline the obtained results:   27 








Adj R2  0.13 
Estimation Method  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
Again,  our  intuition  is  empirically  confirmed.  In  the  case  of  the  developing 
economies, the taxes on income, profits and capital gains per capita increase approximately 
1.20% with every additional percent of output per capita growth.  
Both estimations prove that the examined variable is a good proxy for the automatic 
stabilizers as it behaves almost identically in the two sets of countries and furthermore, 
suggests the expected countercyclical pattern of the automatic fiscal stance. For the purposes 
of simplicity in our additional work, the fiscal variable taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains that we empirically proved to represent the measure and the cyclical stance of the 
automatic stabilizers will be referred to as AUTO. 
3.3.  Cyclicality of Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
In the next step of our empirical analysis we try to identify a cyclical pattern of the 
discretionary fiscal impulses that we have built – the OECD and the Blanchard discretionary 
policy measures. For the panel of the developed countries we ignore Eq. (5a) so, we estimate 
only Eq. (5b). In Table 12 we outline the obtained results: 








Adj R2  0.00 
Estimation Method  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99%   28 
The  derived  results  are  statistically  insignificant,  thus  we  cannot  draw  any 
conclusions about the behavior of the discretionary fiscal policy in the developed nations. 
The   coefficient of defined explanatory variable is insignificant and   explains 
0% of the variability of the growth rate of  . Therefore, as specified in Section 3, we 
define the discretionary fiscal impulse in the developed economies to be acyclical. 
Next, we conduct Eq. (5a) and (5b) on the panel of the developing countries. In 
Table 13 we outline the obtained results: 













Adj R2  0.00  0.03 
Estimation Method  Random Effects  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
The estimated results recognize only Eq. (5b) to be statistically significant. We see 
that the discretionary OECD measure exhibits countercyclical pattern as 1% of GDP per 
capita growth is mirrored by -0.09% discretionary contraction. In the case of Eq. (5a), the 
data of the Blanchard measure is extremely limited for the panel of the developing countries 
and thus, estimated strongly insignificant results can be disregarded. Nevertheless, the small 
values of the Adj R2 and the  coefficient in the estimated regression equation (5b), imply 
that the effect of the tested fiscal variable is negligible to the behaviour of the growth rate of 
 over the business cycle. Therefore, based on the obtained estimations, we cannot 
draw any credible conclusions about the discretionary fiscal impulse in the set of developing 
countries as well. 
The derived results in this section failed to give us any valuable information about 
the behavior of the discretionary impulse in both sets of economies.  
3.4.  Effects of Fiscal Policy on Growth and Output Volatility 
This part of our interpretation of the obtained empirical results is the most important one in 
our work. Here we find whether fiscal policy affects output volatility or not. First, we 
estimate regression equations (7a) and (7b) on the panel of the developed countries. In Table 
14 we outline the obtained results:   29 






















Adj R2  0.06  0.06 
Estimation Method  Random Effects  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
In both equations, the explanatory variable that represents the automatic stabilizers 
is found to be significant with identical negative relation to the measure of output volatility, 
whereas  both  measures  of  discretionary  fiscal  policy  are  recognized  to  be  statistically 
insignificant.  The  estimations  show  that  1%  increase  of  the  automatic  fiscal  stance 
contributes to 0.024% less output volatility. This finding is of particular interest knowing 
that the fiscal stance of the automatic stabilizers is strongly countercyclical. Thus, it implies 
that not only the behavior of the automatic stabilizers, but also the countercyclical fiscal 
stance have a beneficent effect on output volatility in the sample of the developed countries. 
To verify our findings concerned with the automatic stabilizers and output volatility 
we conduct the same regression equations on the panel of the developing economies. In 
Table 15 we outline the obtained results: 


















  - 
-0.007 
(0.029)   30 
t-stat -0.25 
Adj R2  0.09  0.02 
Estimation Method  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
Interestingly, the estimated results greatly resemble the ones obtained on the panel 
of the developed countries. Again, our proxy of the automatic stabilizers is found to be 
significant and negatively related to output volatility in both regression equations, whereas 
the two discretionary impulses are identified as statistically insignificant. In Eq. (7a) and (7b), 
1% increase of the automatic fiscal stance is mirrored by 0.036% and 0.015% less output 
volatility, respectively. Those  findings  only  strengthen  the  previously  drawn  conclusions 
about the effect of the automatic stabilizers and the countercyclical fiscal policy on output 
volatility. 
However, we notice that although the relationship of the automatic stabilizers to 
output volatility is negative, it is estimated with Adj R2 and   coefficients of small nominal 
value. The small Adj R2 could be addressed to the fact that fiscal policy cannot fully explain 
the variability of the per capita GDP output gap. As we are not looking for the full set of 
explanatory variables of output volatility, but instead, we only attempt to identify a credible 
relationship between fiscal policy and output volatility, the small nominal values of the Adj 
R2 for both panels of data are tolerable for the correctness of the interpretations of the 
obtained results. The small values of the estimated   coefficients are also reasonable and 
acceptable, knowing that fiscal policy can have only limited influence on output. Therefore, 
we recognize the estimated results as credible and furthermore, we draw the conclusion that, 
regardless of the type of economy, automatic stabilizers and countercyclical fiscal policy 
decrease output volatility, not taking into account the scale of the exhibited effect. 
Connecting our findings, that automatic stabilizers and countercyclical fiscal policy 
as a whole contribute to less output volatility, with Endogenous Growth Theory, which states 
that low levels of output volatility result in higher economic growth in the long-run, we can 
derive another conclusion that countercyclical fiscal policy could be a key determinant in 
boosting economic prosperity in the long-run. In fact, our empirical conclusions of the role 
of fiscal policy over the business cycle support the Keynesian view of how fiscal policy 
should  be  conducted  in  order  to  promote  economic  growth. Moreover,  based  on  our 
findings in Section 3.1 of this chapter, we see that in fact, the conducted countercyclical 
fiscal policy by the developed nations could explain, the some extend, the lower levels of 
output volatility per capita as outlined by Table 16. On the other hand, the opposite could be 
true for the sample of the developing nations.   31 
Table 16. Arithmetic Mean and 95% Confidence Interval of   
Data Panels  Developed  Developing 
Arithmetic Mean  0.96  1.84 
95% Confidence Interval  (0.85, 1.07)  (1.71, 1.98) 
3.5.  Determinants of Fiscal Policy 
Knowing that fiscal policy, in particular countercyclical fiscal policy, does have an implication 
to  economic  growth,  it  is  of  great  importance  to  identify  some  of  its  determinants. 
However, according to our methodology, we only know that the given state is whether in a 
good or a bad time, meaning that the actual output is whether close to or far from the 
potential one, but don‟t know if the economy is in a boom or a recession, we cannot give 
direction to the dependent fiscal variables, so they to exhibit countercyclical fiscal pattern. 
However,  our  findings  are  important  due  to  the  fact  that  policy  makers  can  use  the 
recognized determinants of fiscal policy accordingly, to enhance the desired direction of the 
needed fiscal policy for the given stage of the business cycle in which the economy resides. 
We conduct regression equation (8a) on the panel of the developed economies, 
ignoring the statistically invalid regressions. In Table 17 we outline the obtained results: 
Table 17. Determinants of Fiscal Policy in Developed Countries –  
Good Times, Eq. (8a) 









































Adj R2  0.02  0.13  0.02 
Estimation Method  Fixed Effects  Random Effects  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
The estimations identify three determinants of fiscal policy in good times for the 
developed countries - openness to trade, corruption and financial development, respectively   32 
having impact on the growth rate of the government revenues per capita and the growth rate 
of government expenditures per capita.  
In addition, we perform regression equation (8b) on the panel of the developed 
countries, ignoring the statistically invalid regressions. In Table 18 we outline the obtained 
results: 
Table 18. Determinants of Fiscal Policy in Developed Countries –  
Bad Times, Eq. (8b) 





























Adj R2  0.16  0.26 
Estimation Method  Random Effects  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
The estimated two regressions identify only one determinant of fiscal policy in good 
times for the developed countries – the control of corruption index, having impact on the 
automatic fiscal stance. 
We continue by estimating regression equation (8a) on the panel of the developing 
countries, ignoring the statistically invalid regressions. In Table 19 we outline the obtained 
results: 
Table 19. Determinants of Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries –  
Good Times, Eq. (8a) 
Dependent 
Variable 





































































Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* - Significant at 90% 
** - Significant at 95% 
*** - Significant at 99% 
The derived results show only two determinants of fiscal policy in good times in the 
sample of the developing countries – openness to trade, having impact the discretionary 
fiscal policy, and terms of trade, affecting the growth rate of government expenditures per 
capita. We do not perform estimation of Eq. (8b) on the panel of the developing countries 
as all of the variants of the equation appeared to be statistically invalid. 
Our empirical results recognize each of the used explanatory variables to affect the 
fiscal policy of a given state, whether in good or bad times. However, Eq. (8a) and Eq. (8b) 
for both panels of data are estimated with very low Adj. R2, which implies that the behaviour 
of dependent fiscal variables is not properly explained. Therefore, one of our conclusions 
based on those regression equations is that more determinants of fiscal policy should be 
identified  in  order  to  reach  credible  values  of  the  estimated  Adj.  R2  and  thus,  build 
confidence on the recognized statistically significant relationships. 
Nevertheless, those findings are important for policy makers who are facing fiscal 
policy constraints, but want to engage in a certain fiscal stance. The identified determinants 
of fiscal policy could be used as a tool to develop or enhance countercyclical fiscal policy, 
which our work empirically identified to lower output volatility and thus, suggests an increase 
in economic growth in the long-run. 
V.  Conclusion 
Our work empirically found that fiscal policy affects output volatility. We identified a 
negative relationship between automatic stabilizers and volatility of output per capita, in 
both developed and developing economies. The conducted empirical analysis proved the 
economic intuition that the automatic fiscal stance is countercyclical, regardless of the size 
and the prosperity of the economy. Based on those findings, we drew the conclusion that the 
automatic stabilizers and the countercyclical fiscal policy, as a whole, reduce the output   34 
volatility. Connecting our empirical results to the Endogenous Growth Theory, we developed 
the idea that countercyclical fiscal policy boosts long-term economic growth. 
We  recognized  the  fiscal  policy  pattern  of  the  developed  nations  to  be 
countercyclical, whereas the one of the developing countries to be acyclical. We estimated 
the 95% confidence interval for the level of output volatility in both samples of countries 
and the derived results supported our hypothesis that countercyclical fiscal policy reduces 
output volatility. The volatility of per capita output of the developed nations appeared 
significantly less than the one of the developing countries. 
Moreover, we identified possible determinants of fiscal policy in both good and bad 
times, where we defined as good times the years, in which the actual output is close to the 
potential one, and vice versa. We empirically recognized that openness to trade, terms of 
trade, level of corruption and financial development affect fiscal policy in both samples of 
developed and developing countries. We proposed the idea that restricted policy makers can 
use the identified determinants as tools to manipulate fiscal policy. 
Although, all of the inferred estimations are robust and statistically significant, they 
have to be interpreted with caution. Overall, our findings suggest that more fiscal variables 
and models should be built, in order to credibly prove the conclusions presented in this 
paper. We admit that further research is needed to fully explain the role of the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy on output volatility and economic growth.   35 
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Appendix A 
Table 20. List of Developed and Developing Countries 
Developed Countries  Developing Countries 
USA  Colombia 
Japan  Costa Rica 
Germany  Cyprus 
UK  Dominican Republic 
France  Ethiopia 
Italy  Guatemala 
Canada  India 
  Indonesia 
  Israel 
  Kenya 
  Mauritius 
  Mexico 
  Morocco 
  New Zealand 
  Pakistan 
  Panama 
  Singapore 
  South Africa 
  Sri Lanka 
  Thailand 
  Tunisia 
  Turkey 
  Uruguay 
   39 
Table 21. List of Base Variables and Their Sources. 
Base Variable  Source 
Population  Penn World Table 6.2 
GDP Deflator  United Nations Data Online 
Nominal Total Government Revenues (local 
currency) 
IMF Historical Government Finance Statistics, 
IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Nominal Total Government Expenditure (local 
currency) 
IMF Historical Government Finance Statistics, 
IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Nominal Gross Domestic Product (local 
currency)  United Nations Data Online 
Nominal Tax on Income, Profits and Capital 
Gains (local currency) 
IMF Historical Government Finance Statistics, 
IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Unemployment Rate  IMF Data Mapper, OECD Statistics Databases, 
World Development Indicators Online 
Nominal Imports (local currency)  World Development Indicators Online 
Nominal Exports (local currency)  World Development Indicators Online 
Nominal Private Credit (local currency)  World Development Indicators Online 
Control of Corruption Index  Transparency International  
+ -   40 
Appendix B 
Variables 
dlngdppc =    
dlnrevpc =    
dlnexppc =    
fbgdp =    
dlntipcgpc =    
l1discrblanchard =    
l1discroecd =    
absgdpgappercent =    
gooddlnrevpc =    
gooddlnexppc =    
gooddlntipcgpc =    
goodl1discrblanchard =    
goodl1discroecd =    
goodopen =    
goodtot =    
goodcorr =    
goodfindev =    
baddlnrevpc =    
baddlntipcgpc =    
badopen =    
badtot =    
badcorr =    
badfindev =      41 




. xtreg d.lnrevpc d.lngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       189 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         7 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1868                         Obs per group: min =        18 
       between = 0.6429                                        avg =      27.0 
       overall = 0.1953                                        max =        29 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =     45.39 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   D.lnrevpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lngdppc | 
         D1. |   .9029767   .1340317     6.74   0.000     .6402793    1.165674 
       _cons |   .0109222   .0038473     2.84   0.005     .0033817    .0184627 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .03551612 





. xtreg  dlnexppc dlngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       189 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         7 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0283                         Obs per group: min =        18 
       between = 0.4302                                        avg =      27.0 
       overall = 0.0216                                        max =        29 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      4.13 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0421 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    dlnexppc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dlngdppc |  -.2744888   .1350182    -2.03   0.042    -.5391197   -.0098579 
       _cons |   .0329449   .0038756     8.50   0.000     .0253489    .0405409 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .03553705 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (3a) 
 
. xtreg    dlntipcgpc d.lngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       188 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         7 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1370                         Obs per group: min =        18 
       between = 0.2175                                        avg =      26.9 
       overall = 0.1390                                        max =        29 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =     29.88 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  dlntipcgpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lngdppc | 
         D1. |   1.428696   .2613784     5.47   0.000     .9164039    1.940988 
       _cons |   .0039417   .0086547     0.46   0.649    -.0130212    .0209046 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .01151279 
     sigma_e |  .06809357 





. xtreg       l1discroecd dlngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       182 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         7 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0004                         Obs per group: min =        17 
       between = 0.1143                                        avg =      26.0 
       overall = 0.0003                                        max =        28 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      0.05 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.8215 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 l1discroecd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dlngdppc |  -.0122736   .0544156    -0.23   0.822    -.1189263     .094379 
       _cons |  -.0005896   .0014848    -0.40   0.691    -.0034997    .0023206 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .01367587 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (7a) 
 
. xtreg  absgdpgappcpercent l1discrblanchard dlntipcgpc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       182 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         7 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0505                         Obs per group: min =        17 
       between = 0.2525                                        avg =      26.0 
       overall = 0.0560                                        max =        28 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)       =     10.61 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0050 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
absgdpgapp~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
l1discrbla~d |   .0051638    .017583     0.29   0.769    -.0292982    .0396258 
  dlntipcgpc |  -.0237233   .0077532    -3.06   0.002    -.0389194   -.0085273 
       _cons |   .0100921   .0008121    12.43   0.000     .0085004    .0116838 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .00719177 





. xtreg  absgdpgappcpercent  l1discroecd dlntipcgpc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       182 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         7 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0597                         Obs per group: min =        17 
       between = 0.2474                                        avg =      26.0 
       overall = 0.0645                                        max =        28 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)       =     12.34 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0021 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
absgdpgapp~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 l1discroecd |   .0516174   .0394308     1.31   0.191    -.0256656    .1289004 
  dlntipcgpc |  -.0240578   .0074611    -3.22   0.001    -.0386812   -.0094344 
       _cons |    .009961     .00058    17.17   0.000     .0088243    .0110978 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .00716788 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (8a) 
 
. xtreg gooddlnrevpc goodcorr goodfindev goodopen goodtot, robust fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        68 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         7 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0915                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.0273                                        avg =       9.7 
       overall = 0.0153                                        max =        13 
 
                                                F(4,57)            =      2.07 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8900                        Prob > F           =    0.0970 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
gooddlnrevpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    goodcorr |  -.0006915   .0066657    -0.10   0.918    -.0140393    .0126562 
  goodfindev |  -.0000611   .0168743    -0.00   0.997    -.0338514    .0337292 
    goodopen |  -.1092816   .0519779    -2.10   0.040    -.2133655   -.0051978 
     goodtot |   -.053976   .0484979    -1.11   0.270    -.1510915    .0431395 
       _cons |   .1348561   .0853306     1.58   0.120    -.0360156    .3057278 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .02658407 
     sigma_e |  .02568375 





. xtreg  gooddlnexppc goodcorr goodfindev goodopen goodtot, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        68 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         7 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1596                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.1496                                        avg =       9.7 
       overall = 0.1340                                        max =        13 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =      9.75 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0449 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
gooddlnexppc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    goodcorr |   .0065113   .0033583     1.94   0.053    -.0000708    .0130934 
  goodfindev |  -.0288108   .0125081    -2.30   0.021    -.0533262   -.0042953 
    goodopen |  -.0099394   .0208069    -0.48   0.633    -.0507201    .0308413 
     goodtot |  -.0207907   .0312521    -0.67   0.506    -.0820437    .0404623 
       _cons |   .0194966    .039233     0.50   0.619    -.0573986    .0963919 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .02683267 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (8a) 
 
. xtreg    gooddlntipcgpc goodcorr goodfindev goodopen goodtot, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        68 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         7 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0015                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.4992                                        avg =       9.7 
       overall = 0.0168                                        max =        13 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =      1.07 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.8983 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
gooddlntip~c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    goodcorr |  -.0055634   .0066187    -0.84   0.401    -.0185359    .0074091 
  goodfindev |   .0216326   .0246519     0.88   0.380    -.0266842    .0699493 
    goodopen |   .0258592   .0410077     0.63   0.528    -.0545144    .1062327 
     goodtot |   .0006875   .0615939     0.01   0.991    -.1200343    .1214093 
       _cons |   .0460972   .0773232     0.60   0.551    -.1054536    .1976479 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .05420307 






. xtreg  baddlnrevpc badcorr badfindev badtot badopen, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        37 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         6 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0387                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.4723                                        avg =       6.2 
       overall = 0.1627                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =      4.73 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.3164 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 baddlnrevpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     badcorr |  -.0075995   .0070789    -1.07   0.283    -.0214738    .0062748 
   badfindev |  -.0445207   .0340534    -1.31   0.191    -.1112641    .0222228 
      badtot |  -.0761066   .0994159    -0.77   0.444    -.2709583     .118745 
     badopen |     .02545   .0457324     0.56   0.578    -.0641838    .1150838 
       _cons |   .1860226   .1100888     1.69   0.091    -.0297475    .4017926 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .01154458 
     sigma_e |  .03755878 
         rho |  .08632297   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (8b) 
 
. xtreg    baddlntipcgpc badcorr badfindev badtot badopen, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        37 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =         6 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0564                         Obs per group: min =         4 
       between = 0.7371                                        avg =       6.2 
       overall = 0.2573                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =     11.09 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0256 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
baddlntipc~c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     badcorr |  -.0190846   .0091967    -2.08   0.038    -.0371099   -.0010593 
   badfindev |   -.063973   .0484295    -1.32   0.187    -.1588931    .0309472 
      badtot |  -.1136766   .1403825    -0.81   0.418    -.3888212     .161468 
     badopen |   .0712178   .0591759     1.20   0.229    -.0447649    .1872005 
       _cons |   .3001741   .1492245     2.01   0.044     .0076994    .5926488 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .05605436 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Regression Equations – Developing Countries 
Eq. (2a) 
 
. xtreg dlnrevpc dlngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       554 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        23 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2403                         Obs per group: min =         9 
       between = 0.6047                                        avg =      24.1 
       overall = 0.2513                                        max =        29 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =    185.29 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    dlnrevpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dlngdppc |   1.033266   .0759077    13.61   0.000     .8844894    1.182042 
       _cons |   .0084197    .003717     2.27   0.024     .0011345    .0157049 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .08079114 





. xtreg  dlnexppc dlngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       554 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        23 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0782                         Obs per group: min =         9 
       between = 0.4849                                        avg =      24.1 
       overall = 0.0870                                        max =        29 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =     52.58 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    dlnexppc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dlngdppc |   .7477493   .1031221     7.25   0.000     .5456337    .9498648 
       _cons |   .0092211   .0050496     1.83   0.068     -.000676    .0191182 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .10989482 
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Eq. (2c) 
 
. xtreg   fbgdp dlngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       554 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        23 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0109                         Obs per group: min =         9 
       between = 0.0718                                        avg =      24.1 
       overall = 0.0222                                        max =        29 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      6.48 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0109 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       fbgdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dlngdppc |  -.0930149   .0365448    -2.55   0.011    -.1646413   -.0213884 
       _cons |   .0218898     .00545     4.02   0.000     .0112079    .0325717 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   .0247497 
     sigma_e |  .03610431 





. xtreg    dlntipcgpc dlngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       551 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        23 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1148                         Obs per group: min =         9 
       between = 0.5552                                        avg =      24.0 
       overall = 0.1256                                        max =        29 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =     78.88 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  dlntipcgpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dlngdppc |   1.198119   .1349002     8.88   0.000     .9337197    1.462519 
       _cons |   .0092056   .0065758     1.40   0.162    -.0036828     .022094 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .14288015 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (5a) 
 
. xtreg  l1discrblanchard dlngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       185 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        15 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0081                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0318                                        avg =      12.3 
       overall = 0.0004                                        max =        24 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =      1.14 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.2865 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
l1discrbla~d |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dlngdppc |  -.0524182   .0491853    -1.07   0.287    -.1488197    .0439833 
       _cons |  -.0133394   .0053238    -2.51   0.012    -.0237737    -.002905 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .01818021 
     sigma_e |  .02831349 





. xtreg   l1discroecd dlngdppc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       526 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        23 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0293                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.0380                                        avg =      22.9 
       overall = 0.0280                                        max =        28 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(1)       =     15.09 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0001 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 l1discroecd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    dlngdppc |  -.0895968   .0230682    -3.88   0.000    -.1348096   -.0443839 
       _cons |    .000619   .0011129     0.56   0.578    -.0015621    .0028002 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .02374424 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (7a) 
 
. xtreg absgdpgappcpercent l1discrblanchard dlntipcgpc, robust fe  
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       183 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        15 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1081                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.1895                                        avg =      12.2 
       overall = 0.0872                                        max =        24 
 
                                                F(2,166)           =      5.82 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0044                         Prob > F           =    0.0036 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
absgdpgapp~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
l1discrbla~d |  -.0249348   .0387535    -0.64   0.521     -.101448    .0515784 
  dlntipcgpc |   -.036085   .0109865    -3.28   0.001    -.0577764   -.0143937 
       _cons |   .0195862   .0014402    13.60   0.000     .0167426    .0224297 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .00994556 
     sigma_e |  .01576367 





. xtreg absgdpgappcpercent  l1discroecd dlntipcgpc, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       524 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        23 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0183                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.0126                                        avg =      22.8 
       overall = 0.0175                                        max =        28 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)       =      9.53 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0085 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
absgdpgapp~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 l1discroecd |  -.0075152   .0297872    -0.25   0.801     -.065897    .0508667 
  dlntipcgpc |  -.0145809   .0047239    -3.09   0.002    -.0238396   -.0053222 
       _cons |   .0189012   .0015208    12.43   0.000     .0159204     .021882 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .00637113 
     sigma_e |  .01606518 
         rho |  .13590184   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (8a) 
 
. xtreg   gooddlnrevpc goodcorr goodfindev goodopen goodtot, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       110 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        18 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0137                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.3390                                        avg =       6.1 
       overall = 0.0736                                        max =        16 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =      8.35 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0796 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
gooddlnrevpc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    goodcorr |  -.0083831   .0034803    -2.41   0.016    -.0152044   -.0015618 
  goodfindev |   .0159762   .0329676     0.48   0.628    -.0486391    .0805915 
    goodopen |   .0446148   .0312241     1.43   0.153    -.0165834    .1058129 
     goodtot |  -.0347702   .0323664    -1.07   0.283    -.0982073    .0286668 
       _cons |   .0653079    .034116     1.91   0.056    -.0015582     .132174 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .07740462 





. xtreg  gooddlnexppc goodcorr goodfindev goodopen goodtot, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       110 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        18 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0623                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0765                                        avg =       6.1 
       overall = 0.0807                                        max =        16 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =      9.21 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0560 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
gooddlnexppc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    goodcorr |   .0027285   .0043865     0.62   0.534    -.0058689    .0113259 
  goodfindev |  -.0609358   .0415516    -1.47   0.143    -.1423755    .0205039 
    goodopen |  -.0210737   .0393542    -0.54   0.592    -.0982065    .0560592 
     goodtot |  -.0837068    .040794    -2.05   0.040    -.1636615   -.0037521 
       _cons |   .1217881    .042999     2.83   0.005     .0375115    .2060647 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .09623363 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (8a) 
 
. xtreg     gooddlntipcgpc goodcorr goodfindev goodopen goodtot, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       109 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        18 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0360                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0141                                        avg =       6.1 
       overall = 0.0373                                        max =        16 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =      2.46 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.6517 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
gooddlntip~c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    goodcorr |  -.0079154   .0067288    -1.18   0.239    -.0211035    .0052728 
  goodfindev |   .0065062   .0529739     0.12   0.902    -.0973208    .1103333 
    goodopen |   .0464848    .054058     0.86   0.390    -.0594669    .1524365 
     goodtot |   .0389795   .0514426     0.76   0.449    -.0618461    .1398051 
       _cons |   .0012869   .0590148     0.02   0.983    -.1143801    .1169538 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .03939603 
     sigma_e |  .10600958 





. xtreg     gooddlntipcgpc goodcorr goodfindev goodopen goodtot, robust fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       109 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        18 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0574                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0311                                        avg =       6.1 
       overall = 0.0254                                        max =        16 
 
                                                F(4,87)            =      1.09 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6949                        Prob > F           =    0.3688 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
gooddlntip~c |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    goodcorr |  -.0177093   .0166946    -1.06   0.292    -.0508916    .0154731 
  goodfindev |  -.0452644   .0533656    -0.85   0.399    -.1513344    .0608055 
    goodopen |   .2375228   .1251956     1.90   0.061     -.011317    .4863626 
     goodtot |   .0601002   .0995895     0.60   0.548    -.1378448    .2580452 
       _cons |  -.0479902   .1290221    -0.37   0.711    -.3044357    .2084553 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .10902585 
     sigma_e |  .10600958 
         rho |  .51402407   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
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Eq. (8a) 
 
. xtreg       goodl1discroecd goodcorr goodfindev goodopen goodtot, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       109 
Group variable (i): iid                         Number of groups   =        18 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0099                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0056                                        avg =       6.1 
       overall = 0.0158                                        max =        16 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(4)       =      1.67 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.7954 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
goodl1dis~cd |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    goodcorr |   .0011558   .0010563     1.09   0.274    -.0009146    .0032262 
  goodfindev |  -.0088516   .0100007    -0.89   0.376    -.0284526    .0107494 
    goodopen |   .0040126    .009485     0.42   0.672    -.0145776    .0226029 
     goodtot |  -.0033227   .0098245    -0.34   0.735    -.0225784    .0159331 
       _cons |  -.0015552   .0104118    -0.15   0.881     -.021962    .0188516 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  .02388355 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
 
  